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UNITED STATES Cert to CAS 
(~ [CJ], Heaney, Becker [Sr.DJ, 
v. cone.]) 
JACOBSEN, et ux. Federal/Criminal Timely (w/extn) 
1. SUMMARY: Where a search by a private parcel carrier's 
employees of a damaged package has resulted in the employees' 
observation a white powder contained in the package, and the employees 
~/ then turn over the package, with the white substance in plain view, to 
,. 
law enforcement officers: whether the officers must obtain a search 
~ -
warrant before conducting a chemical field test to determine whether 
~- ~ &1~ « ~~; ~~~ 
• f 
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the substance is cocaine. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Employees of Federal 
Express, a private company that delivers parcels, discovered that a 
parcel entrusted to them for delivery to one D. Jacobs, Apple Valley, 
Minn., had been damaged in transit. Pursuant to company policy, the ...... 
employees opened the package to view its contents. Inside, they 
discovered a 10 inch cardboard tube, sealed with "duct tape," 
cushioned by wads of newspaper. The employees opened the tube, and 
discovered that it contained a packet of white powder enclosed in four 
~ 
clear plastic baggies. Suspecting that the powder was a controlled 
substance, they contacted the DEA. They reinserted the plastic packet 
in the cardboard tube, but did not reseal the tube. The white 
substance remained visible. 
When the DEA agent arrived, he removed the plastic bags from 
the tube and extracted from the packet a 
He tested it chemically on the spot, and 
~
small portion of the powder.~ 
determined from the chemical .fee.(/ 
test that the substance was cocaine. He also checked by computer the 
address on the package, and determined that it was resps'. Resp 
Bradley Jacobsen's name appeared on several DEA reports suspecting him 
of trafficking in cocaine. The~ agent obtained a warrant to search --Jacobsen's residence on the basis of the field test and the DEA 
~ 
reports. He then re-wrapped the package, and dressed in civilian 
clothes delivered the package to Jacobsen's residence. An hour later, 
he returned to make the search with other DEA agents and the warrant. 
Bradley Jacobsen answered the door. The agents announced 
that they had a warrant to search. Jacobsen slammed the door in their 
face, yelling "It's the police -- flush it!" The police broke down 
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the door, and seized the remains of the cocaine, which included 
paraphernalia, cocaine traces, and the burned remnants of the package 
that had earlier been delivered. Jacobsen and his wife Donna were 
arrested. Both were charged with a single count of possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine and Bradley was charged with assault on a 
federal officer. The~ (D. Minn. MacLaughlin) denied resps' 
suppression motion and permitted the seized materials to be introduced ./ 
3. DECISION BELOW: 
They were convicted on an all counts. ~
The CAS reversed, relying on ~lter v.~ I 
against them. 
United States, 447 u.s. 649 (19SO). 
(\.,~~~ 
In Walter, a private carrier ,~-
delivered a package to the wrong company. Employees of the company 
opened the package, and discovered a number of film boxes purporting 
to contain sexually explicit movies. They opened some of the boxes 
and held the film up to the light, but could not see what they 
depicted. They then contacted the FBI, which took the films back to 
headquarters and screened them. Determining that they were obscene, 
they had them delivered, arrested the correct addressees, and 
introduced the films in evidence against them. This Court reversed 
the conviction, finding that the FBI needed a warrant to screen the 
films, even though they had come into government possession lawfully. 
JUSTICE STEVENS' plurality opinion, said CAS, found that projection of 
the films was a significant expansion of the search that had been 
conducted previously by a private party. Therefore, absent any 
exigency, it could only be undertaken with a warrant. 
Applying Walter to this case, the CAS said: 
"The DEA agents' extension of the private search 
precisely parallels that in Walter. In both cases, viewing 
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the objects with unaided v1s1on produced only an inference 
of criminal activity. In both cases, government agents went 
beyond the scope of the private search by using mechanical 
or chemical means to discover the hidden nature of the 
objects. The governmental activity represents a significant 
extension of the private searches because it revealed the 
content of the films in Walter and, here, the composition of 
the powder. In the absence of exigent circumstances, which 
the government does not allege, we hold the agents were 
required to obtain a warrant authorizing the taking of 
samples and analysis thereof." Pet. App. 6. 
The CAB acknowledged that, "[i]n almost identical circumstances," the 
CA6 held that a warrant was not required to conduct a chemical 
analysis. United States v. Barry, 673 F.2d 912, 920 (CA6 19B2}, cert. 
denied, No. Bl-6942 (Oct. 12, 19B2}. The CAB rejected Barry's 
contention that Walter should be understood as a First Amendment case. 
The chemical testing was necessary to obtaining the warrant to 
search resps' home, and therefore the search and everything obtained 
thereby was fruits of an unlawful search. 
Sr. DJ Becker concurred, finding Walter to be controlling, 
although he said he generally agreed with the views of the four 
dissenters in that case. 
4. CONTENTIONS: On the strength of the ith Barry, its 
assertion that the CAB decision is plainly 
reasonable law enforcement efforts will be unduly burdened by this 
decision, the SG requests a grant. The substance had lawfully come 
into the possession of the law enforcement agents, and when it was 
delivered it was in plain view. The chemical test to which the 
substance was subjected was capable of revealing only this: whether 
the substance was cocaine. Surely in these circumstances, the test 
invaded no reasonable privacy expectations. The decision casts a 
cloud over the legality of all field testing for narcotics, since in a 
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search incident to arrest, or a normal search based upon a warrant, 
the officer does not have a warrant to test chemically any seized 
materials. 
For these reasons, Walter is distinguishable. Viewing a film 
discloses far more information than a chemical test of a white powder 
-- a film may reveal much about the ideas and attitudes of the person 
who made it and the recipient. Moroever, the opinion of JUSTICE 
STEVENS, with whom Justice Stewart joined, did rely at least in part 
on the fact that First Amendment concerns were there implicated. 
Field tests are important to law enforcement; in many cases, 
requiring a warrant will unduly delay the progress of an 
investigation. 
~sps argue that the decision below is compelled by Walter, and ....... ___ _ 
therefore cert. should not be granted. Walter stands for the 
proposition that the police may not, without a warrant or exigent 
~
circumstances, go beyond the scope of a private search. The officers 
plainly did so here. Barry is not in the CA6 there 
relied upon the fact that the methaqualone pills tested by the DEA 
were discovered, once the package had been opened by Federal Express, 
in bottles that were clearly labelled "methaqualone." Because the 
defendant had taken insufficient steps to protect against the risk of 
exposure, the CA6 reasoned that he had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Here, resps took many steps to keep secret the contents of 
the package, even once it was opened. 
Finally, law enforcement interests will not be severely hampered 
here. This case deals only with whether a warrant must be obtained for 
a chemical test where such would exceed the scope of a preceding 
• I 
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private search on which the governm relies to make its own. This 
does not implicate the "plain cases, search incident to warrant 
cases, etc. These are ere the materials have been "lawfully 
seized," which resps to be different from this case. 
5. DISCUSSION: the CAB's admission that its decision 
conflicts with Barry, although there is tension, the peculiar nature 
of _:he~rr1 ~:cision makes the conflict less than square. The CA6 
there first reasoned that the law enforcement officers should have 
obtained a warrant before they went to the Federal Express office to 
view the opened package: the search was therefore illegal if Barry had 
any reasonable expectation of privacy in the package. Then the CA6 
reasoned that, because Barry had not attempted to disguise the fact 
that the pill bottles contained contraband, he had no reasonable 
expectation in the package once it was opened by Federal Express. 
Walter was distinguished because it was a First Amendment case. 
Therefore, once the officers had the pill bottles, they could make 
their "routine" chemical testing without violating that case. Thus, 
the CA6 found a peculiar sort of unlawful warrantless search, but held 
that Barry's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Its 
interpretation of Walter is at odds with the CAB's, however. 
Walter may bear further explanation. The five Justices voting to 
reverse there were divided. Justices Stevens and Stewart were 
together on one opinion, Justices White and Brennan on another, and 
Justice Marshall simply concurred in the judgment. The Chief Justice, 
~ Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined Justice Blackmun's dissent. 
~he Walter decision has First Amendment overtones, but the CAB's ------------interpretation of that decision was not wholly unreasonable given the 
, 
- 7 -
divergence of opinion in Walter. Still, the SG's argument that the 
CAB erred here is persuasive: there is little to distinguish the 
-------------------------chemical testing here from the chemical field testing in typical plain 
view seizures and even seizures incident to a warrant. The intrusion 
~
does seem lesser, perhaps, than screening a film. 
Finally, the facts here may not be as unusual as one might 
suppose. In addition to this case and Barry, resps inform the Court 
that the CA9 is now considering a case on similar facts. 
6. RECOMMENDATION: For these reasons I recommend a grant. 
Although the SG suggests that the Court might consider summary 
reversal, I do not recommend it because the CAB's may be a reasonable 
interpretation of Walter. Moreover, plenary review in this case would 
give the Court an opportunity to clarify the confusion created by the 
lack of a majority opinion in the Walter case. 
There is a response. 
February 23, 19B3 Ogden opn in petn 
Court ................... . ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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Memo to My Clerk: 
Over the weekend I read preli.minari ly the briefs 
in this case, and I do not think it necessary for me to have 
a bench memo. 
The Court below, CAS, relied on the plurality 
opinion i.n Walter "· u.s., where federal officers viewed a 
film that had been seize~ 1awfu11v bv a private partv. T 
dissented in W.;lter, and still think i.t was wrongly decided. 
Perhaps Walter can be distinguished, as is argued, on the 
ground that viewi.nq a film is more intrusive than making a 
chemical "field test" on a substance that already is 
exposed. 
In anv event, I am quit~ familiar with ~he area. 
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From: Justice Stevens 
JAN 17 1984 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-1167 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. BRADLEY~ ()__ 
THOMAS JACOBSEN AND DONNA MARIE JACOBSEN c!.£L~ 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 0--j ~ 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ~~/JAI-A'J 
[January-, 1984] ~- ' /' - -- '--' 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
During their examination of a damaged package, the em-
ployees of a private freight carrier observed a white powdery 
substance, originally concealed within eight layers of 
wrappings. They summoned a federal agent, who removed 
a trace of the powder, subjected it to a chemical test and de-
termined that it was cocaine. The question presented is 
whether the Fourth Amendment required the agent to obtain 
a warrant before he did so. 
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Early in the morn-
ing of May 1, 1981, a supervisor at the Minneapolis-St. Paul 
airport Federal Express office asked the office manager to 
look at a package that had been damaged and tom by a fork-
lift. They then opened the package in order to examine its 
contents pursuant to a written company policy regarding in-
surance claims. 
The container was an ordinary cardboard box wrapped in 
brown paper. Inside the box five or six pieces of crumpled 
newspaper covered a tube about about 10 inches long; the 
tube was made of the silver tape used on basement ducts. 
The supervisor and office manager cut open the tube, and 
found a series of four zip-lock plastic bags, the outermost en-
closing the other three and the innermost containing about 
six and a half ounces of white powder. When they observed 
the white powder in the innermost bag, they notified the 
82-1167-0PINION 
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Drug Enforcement Administration. Before the first DEA 
agent arrived, they replaced the plastic bags in the tube and 
put the tube and the newspapers back into the box. 
When the first federal agent arrived, the box, still 
wrapped in brown paper, but with a hole punched in its side 
and the top open, was placed on a desk. The agent saw that 
one end of the tube had been slit open; he removed the four 
plastic bags from the tube and saw the white powder. He 
then opened each of the four bags and removed a trace of the 
white substance with a knife blade. A field test made on the 
spof identified the substance as cocaine. 1 
In due course, other agents arrived, made a second field 
test, rewrapped the package, obtained a warrant to search 
the place to w_bich it was addressed, executed the warrant, 
and arrested respondents. After they were indicted for the 
crime of possessing an illegal substance with intent to distrib-
ute, their motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that 
the warrant was the product of an illegal search and seizure 
was denied; they were tried and convicted, and appealed. 
The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the validity of 
the search warrant depended on the validity of the agents' 
warrantless test of the white powder/ that the testing con-
stituted a significant expansion of the earlier private search, 
'As the test is described in the evidence, it involved the use of three test 
tubes. When a substance containing cocaine is placed in one test tube 
after another, it will cause liquids to take on ~certain sequence of colors. 
Such a test discloses whether or not the substance is cocaine, but there is 
no evidence that it would identify any other substances. 
'The Court of Appeals did not hold that the facts would not have justi-
fied the issuance of a warrant without reference to the test results; the 
court merely held that the facts recited in the warrant application, which 
relied almost entirely on the results of the field tests, would not support 
the issuance of the warrant if the field test was itself unlawful. "It is ele-
mentary that in passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing court 
may consider only information brought to the magistrate's attention." 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 413, n. 3 (1969) (emphasis in origi-
nal) (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 109, n. 1 (1964)). See Illi-
nois v. Gates, - U. S. -, - (1983). 
82-1167--0PINION 
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and that a warrant was required. 683 F. 2d 296 (8th Cir. 
1982). 
As the Court of Appeals recognized, its decision conflicted 
with a decision of another court of appeals on comparable 
facts, United States v. Barry, 673 F. 2d 912 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 U. S. -- (1982). 3 For that reason, and be-
cause field tests play an important role in the enforcement of 
the narcotics laws, we granted certiorari,-- U. S. --. 
I 
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that 
the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated .... " This text protects two 
types of expectations, one involving "searches," the other 
"seizures." A "search" occurs when an expectation of pri-
vacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is in-
fringed. 4 A "seizure" of property occurs when a there is 
some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory 
interests in that property. 5 This Court has also consistently 
3 See also People v. Adler, 50 N. Y.2d 730, 409 N. E. 2d 888, 431 
N. Y.S. 2d 412, cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1014 (1980); cf. United States v. 
Andrews, 618 F. 2d 646 (lOth Cir.) (upholding warrantless field test with-
out discussion), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 824 (1980). 
•see Illinois v. Andreas,- U.S.-,- (1983); United States v. 
Knotts,- U.S.-,- (1983); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
739-741 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 9 (1968). 
• See United States v. Place,- U. S. -, (1983); id., at- (BREN- ~ ~ 
NAN, J., concurring in the result); Texas v. Brown, - U. S. -, - A \0$3 
(STEVENS, J., concurring in the judgment); see also United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U. S. 1, 13-14, n. 8 (1977); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 76 
(1906). While the concept of a "seizure" of property is not much discussed 
in our cases, this definition follows from our oft-repeated definition of the 
"seizure" of a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment-
meaningful interference, however brief, with an individual's freedom of 
movement. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 696 (1981); Reid v. 
Georgia, 448 U. S. 438, 440, n. * (1980) (per curiam); United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 551-554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.); Brown 
v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 50 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
82-1167-0PINION 
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construed this protection as proscribing only governmental 
action; it is wholly inapplicable "to a search or seizure, even 
an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not act-
ing as an agent of the Government or with the participation 
or knowledge of any governmental official." Walter v. 
United States, 447 U. S. 649, 662 (1980) (BLACKMUN, J., 
dissenting). 6 
When the wrapped parcel involved in this case was deliv-
ered to the private freight carrier, it was unquestionably an 
"effect" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Let-
ters and other sea es are in the general class of ef-
fectsm IC e pub c at lar h.as a legitimate expectation 
of privacy; w ess-se c es of such effects are presump-
tively unreasonable. 7 Even when government agents may ) 
lawfully seize such a package to prevent loss or destruction of 7 
suspected contraband, the Fourth Amefldment requires that 
they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such 
a package. 8 Such a warrantless search could not be charac-
terized as reasonable simply because, after the official inva-
sion of privacy occurred, contraband is discovered. 9 Con-
U. S. 873, 878 (1975); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Da-
vis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721, 726-727 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 
1, 16, 19, n. 16 (1968). 
"See id., at 656 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at 660-Q61 (WHITE, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); United States v. Janis, 
428 U. S. 433, 455-456, n. 31 (1976); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U. S. 443, 487-490 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell , 256 U. S. 465 (1921). 
7 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 10 (1977); United States v. 
Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249, 251 (1970); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 
733 (1878); see also Walter, 447 U. S., at 654-655 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). 
8 See, e. g., United States v. Place,- U.S.-,- (1983); United 
States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 809-812 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453 
U. S. 420, 426 (1981) (plurality opinion); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 
753, 762 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 13 and n. 8 (1977); 
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 (1970). There is, of course, 
a well recognized exception for customs searches; but that exception is not 
involved in this case. 
9 See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 567, n. 11 (1971); Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U. S. 471, 484 (1963); Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 
82-1167-0PINION 
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versely, in this case the fact that agents of the private carrier 
independently opened the package and made an examination 
that might have been impermissible for a government agent 
cannot render otherwise reasonable official conduct unrea-
sonable. The reasonableness of an official invasion of the cit-
izen's privacy must be appraised on the basis of the facts as 
they existed at the time that invasion occurred. 
The initial invasions of respondents' package were occa-
sioned by private action. Those invasions revealed that the 
package contained only one significant item, a suspicious 
looking tape tube. Cutting the end of the tube and extract-
ing its contents revealed a suspicious looking plastic bag of 
white powder. Whether those invasions were accidental or 
deliberate, 10 and whether they were reasonable or unreason-
able, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of 
their private character. 
The additional invasions of respondents' privacy by the 
government agent must be tested by the de ee to which 
they exceeded the scope o t e priVa e searc . hat stand-
ar was a p y a majority o the Court in Walter v. 
United States, 447 U. S. 649 (1980). In Walter a private 
party had opened a misdirected carton, found rolls of motion 
picture films that appeared to be contraband, and turned the 
carton over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Later, 
without obtaining a warrant, FBI agents obtained a projector 
and viewed the films. While there was no single opinion of 
the Court, a majority did a ee on the a ro r·a e analysis of 
a governmental search which follows on the heels of a private 
one. Two Justices took the position that, 
253, 261-262 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 103 (1959); 
Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 312 (1958); United States v. DiRe, 
332 U. S. 581, 595 (1948); Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 29 (1927). 
10 A post-trial affidavit indicates that an agent of Federal Express may 
have opened the package because he was suspicious about its contents, and 
not because of damage from a forklift. However, the lower courts found 
no governmental involvement in the private search, a finding not chal-
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"If a properly authorized official search is limited by 
the particular terms of its authorization, at least the 
same kind of strict limitation must be applied to any offi-
cial use of a private party's invasion of another person's 
privacy. ·Even though some circumstances-for exam-
ple, if the results of the private search are in plain view 
when materials are turned over to the Government-
may justify the Government's reexamination of the ma-
terials, surely the Government may not exceed the scope 
of the private search unless ff1ias tlie r1gl'i:t to make an 
in epen en searc . In these cases, the private party 
had not actually viewed the films. Prior to the Govern-
ment's screening one could only draw inferences about 
what was on the films. The projection of the films was a 
significant expansion of the search that had been con-
ducted previously by a private party and therefore must 
be characterized as a separate search." I d., at 657 
(opinion of STEVENS, J., joined by Stewart, J.) (footnote 
omitted). 11 
Four additional Justices, while disagreeing with this charac-
terization of the scope of the private search, were also of the 
view that the legality of the governmental search must be 
tested by the scope of the antecedant private search. 
"Under these circumstances, since the L'Eggs employ-
ees so fully ascertained the nature of the films before 
contacting the authorities, we find that the FBI's subse-
quent viewing of the movies on a projector did not 
'change the nature of the search' and was not an addi-
tional search subject to the warrant requirement." I d., 
11 See also id., at 658-659 (footnotes omitted) ("The fact that the cartons 
were unexpectedly opened by a third party before the shipment was deliv-
ered to its intended consignee does not alter the consignor's legitimate 
expectation of privacy. The private search merely frustrated that expec-
tation in part. It did not simply strip the remaining unfrustrated portion 
of that expectation of all Fourth Amendment protection."). 
82-1167-0PINION 
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at 663-664 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting, joined by BUR-
GER, C. J., POWELL & REHNQUIST, JJ.) (footnote omit-
ted) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 592 F. 2d 788, 
793-794 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Walter v. United 
States, 447 U. S. 649 (1980)). 12 
This standard follows from the analysis applicable when 
private parties' reveal other kinds of private information to 
the authorities. It is well-settled that when an individual re-
veals private information to another, he assumes the risk 
that his confidant will reveal that information to the authori-
ties, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
hibit governmental use of that information. Once frustra-
tion of the ori ·nal ex ectation of privac occurs, the Fourth 
Amerufment does not pro "bit governmental use of t e now-
nonprivate information: "Tills ou as held repeatedly that 
the ~ent does not prohibit the obtaining of in-
formation revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to 
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed 
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited pur-
pose and the confidence placed in a third party will not be be-
trayed." United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 443 
(1975). 13 The Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the 
authorities use information with respect to which the expec-
12 In Walter, a majority of the Court found a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. For present purposes, the disagreement between the ma-
jority and the dissenters in that case with respect to the comparison be-
tween the private search and the official search is less significant than the 
agreement on the standard to be applied in evaluating the relationship be-
tween the two searches. 
13 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 743-744 (1979); United States 
v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 749-753 (1971) (plurality opinion); Osborn v. 
United States, 385 U. S. 323, 326--331 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U. S. 293, 300-303 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206 (1966); Lo-
pez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 437-439 (1963); On Lee v. United 
States, 343 U. S. 747, 753-754 (1952). See also United States v. Henry, 
447 U. S. 264, 272 (1980); United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 744, 
750-751 (1979). 
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tation of privacy has not already been frustrated. In such a 
case the authorities have not relied on what is in effect a pri-
vate search, and therefore presumptively violate the Fourth 
Amendment if they act without a warrant. 14 
In this case, the federal agents' invasions of respondents' 
privacy involved two steps: first, they removed the tube from 
the box, the plastic bags from the tube and a trace of powder 
from the innermost bag; second, they made a chemical test of 
the powder. Although we ultimately conclude that both ac-
tions were reasonable for essentially the same reason, it is 
useful to discuss them separately. 
II 
When the first federal agent on the scene initally saw the 
package, he knew it contained nothing of significance except 
a tube containing plastic bags and, ultimately, white powder. 
It is not entirely clear that the powder was visible to him be-
fore he removed the tube from the box. 16 Even if the white 
powder was not itself in "plain view" because it was still en-
closed in so many containers and covered with papers, there 
was a virtual certainty that nothing else of significance was in 
14 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 
388 U. S. 41 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505 (1961). 
16 Daniel Stegemoller, the Federal Express office manager, testified at 
the suppression hearing that the white substance was not visible without 
reentering the package at the time the first agent arrived. Joint App. 
42-43; 58. The magistrate's report contained a finding that the gray tube 
and powder were in plain view, which respondents challenged before the 
District Court. The District Court declined to resolve respondents' objec-
tion, ruling that fact immaterial and assuming for purposes of its decision 
"that the newspaper in the box covered the gray tube and that neither the 
gray tube nor the contraband could be seen when the box was turned over 
the the DEA agents." App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a-13a. At trial, the fed-
eral agent first on the scene testified that the powder was not visible until 
after he pulled the plastic bags out of the tube. Joint App. 71-72. As our 
discussion will make clear, we agree with the District Court that it does 
not matter whether the loose piece of newspaper covered the tube at the 
time the agent first saw the box. 
,. 
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the package and that a manual inspection of the tube and its 
contents would not tell him anything more than he already 
had been told. Respondents do not dispute that the Govern-
ment could utilize the Federal Express employees' testimony 
concerning the contents of the package. If that is the case, it 
hardly infringed respondents' privacy for the agents to re-
examine the contents of the package. The advantage the 
Government gained thereby was merely avoiding the risk of 
a flaw in the employees' recollection, rather than in further 
infringing respondents' privacy. Protecting the risk of mis-
description hardly enhances any legitimate privacy interest, 
and is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 16 
Thus, the removal of the plastic bags from the tube and the 
agent's visual inspection of their contents enabled the agent 
to learn nothing that had not previously been learned during 
the private search. 17 It infringed no legitimate expectation 
of privacy and hence was not a "search" within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
While the agents' assertion of dominion and control over 
16 See United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 750-751 (1979); United 
States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 749-753 (1971) (plurality opinion); United 
States v. Osborn, 385 U. S. 323, 326--331 (1966); On Lee v. United States, 
343 U. S. 747, 753-754 (1952). For example, in Lopez v. United States, 
373 U. S. 427 (1963), the Court wrote: "Stripped to its essentials, petition-
er's argument amounts to saying that he has a constitutional right to rely 
on possible flaws in the agent's memory, or to challenge the agent's credi-
bility without being beset by corroborating evidence . . . . For no other 
argument can justify excluding an accurate version of a conversation that 
the agent could testify to from memory. We think the risk that petitioner 
took in offering a bribe to Davis fairly included the risk that the offer would 
be accurately reproduced in court .... " !d., at 439 (footnote omitted). 
17 Moreover, since the Federal Express employees had of their own ac-
cord invited the federal agent to their offices for the express purpose of 
viewing the contents of the package, the agent's viewing of what a private 
party had freely made available for his inspection did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
487-490 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 476-476 (1921). 
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the package and its contents did constitute a "seizure," 18 that 
seizure was not unreasonable. The fact that, prior to the 
field test, respondents' privacy interest in the contents of the 
package had been largely compromised, is highly relevant to 
the reasonableness of the agents' conduct in this respect. 
The examination of the tube and the powder it contained was 
comparable to the police officer's observation of a balloon 
"the distinctive character [of which] itself spoke volumes as 
to its contents, particularly to the trained eye of the officer." 
V Texas v. Brown,-- U.S.--,-- (1983) (plurality opin-
ion); see also id., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring in the judg;:.-
ment). The balloon was like the hypothetical gun case irYAr-
kansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979), both of which are 
containers which "by their very nature cannot support any 
reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can 
be inferred from their outward appearance." I d., at 
764-765, n. 13. Such containers may be_seized, at least tem-
porarily, without a warranC on probable cause. 19 Accord-
ingly, since it was apparent that the tube and plastic bags 
contained contraband and little else, this warrantless seizure 
was reasonable. 20 It is well-settled that it is constitutionally 
reasonable for law enforcement officials may seize "effects" 
that cannot support a justifiable expectation of privacy with-
18 Both the Magistrate and the District Court found that the agents took 
custody of the package from Federal Express· after they arrived. Al-
though respondents had entrusted possession of the items to Federal Ex-
press, the decision by governmental authorities to exert dominion and con-
trol over the package for their own purposes clearly constituted a 
"seizure," though not necessarily an unreasonable one. See United States 
v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 (1970). Indeed, this is one thing on which 
the entire Court appeared to agree in Walter. 
19 See also United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 822-823 (1982); Robbins 
v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 428-428 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
2ll Respondents concede that the agents had probable cause to believe the 
package contained contraband. 
~ee Place,- U.S., at-; Texas v. Brown,- U.S., at-; 
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out a warrant based on probable caus to believe they contain 
contraband. 21 --
III 
The uestion remains whether the additional intrusion oc-
casioned by the fiel test, which had not been conducted by 
the Federal Express agents and therefore exceeded the 
scope of the private search, was an unlawful "search" or "sei-
zure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
The field test at issue could disclose only one fact previ-
ously unknown to the agent-whether or not a suspicious 
white powder was cocaine. It could tell him nothing more, 
not even whether the substance was sugar or talcum powder. 
We must first determine whether this can be considered a 
"search" subject to the Fourth Amendment-did it infringe 
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider 
reasonable? 
The concept of an interest in privacy that society is pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, criti-
cally different from the mere expectation, however well justi-
fied, that certain facts will not come to the attention of the 
authorities. 22 Indeed, this distinction underlies the rule that 
id., at-- (STEVENS, J., concurring in the judgment); Payton v. New 
York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 
U. S. 338, 354 (1977); Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234, 236 (1968) 
(per curiam). 
22 "Obviously, however, a 'legitimate' expectation of privacy by definition 
means more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered. A bur-
glar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may have a 
thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one 
which the law recognizes as 'legitimate.' His presence, in the words of ~ 
Jones [v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 267 (1960)], is 'wrongful,' his expec-
tation of privacy is not one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able.' Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
And it would, of course, be merely tautological to fall back on the notion 
that those expectations of privacy which are legitimate depend primarily 
on cases deciding exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases. Legitimation 
of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth 
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Government may utilize information voluntarily disclosed to 
a governmental informant, despite the criminal's reasonable 
expectation that his associates would not disclose confidential 
information to the authorities. See United States v. White, 
401 U. S. 745, 751-752 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a par- 1 
ticular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legiti-
mate interest in privacy. This conclusion is not dependent 
on the result of any particular test. It is probably safe to 
assume that virtually all of the tests conducted under circum-
stances comparable to those disclosed by this record would 
result in a positive finding; in such cases, no legitimate inter-
est has been compromised. But even if the results are nega-
tive-merely disclosing that the substance is something other 
than cocaine-such a result reveals nothing of special inter-
est. Congress has decided-and there is no question about 
its power to do so-to treat the interest in "privately" pos-
sessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental conduct 
that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other 
arguably "private" fact, compromises no legitimate privacy 
interest. 
23 ~ 
This conclusion is dictated by United States v. Place,--
U. S. -- (1983), in which the Court held that subjecting 
luggage to a "sniff test" by a trained narcotics detection dog 
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property 
law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143-144, n. 12 (1978). See also United 
States v. Knotts, - U. S. - (1983) (use of a beeper to track car's 
movements infringed no reasonable expectation of privacy); Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 (1979) (use of a pen register to record phone num-
bers dialed infringed no reasonable expectation of privacy). 
23 See Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the In-
nocent, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1229 (1983). Our discussion, of course, is con-
fined to possession of contraband. It is not necessarily the case that the 
purely "private" possession of an article that cannot be distributed in com-
merce is itself illegitimate. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969). 
,. 
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was not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment: 
"A 'canine sniff' by a well-trained narcotics detection 
dog, however, does not require opening of the luggage. 
It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise 
would remain hidden from public view, as does, for ex-
ample, an officer's rummaging through the contents of 
the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is 
obtained through this investigative technique is much 
less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff 
discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a 
contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff 
tells the authorities something about the contents of the 
luggage, the information obtained is limited." ld., at 
24 
Here, as in Place, the likelihood that official conduct of the 
kind disclosed by the record will actually compromise any le-
gitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote to char-
acterize the testing as a search subject to the Fourth 
Amendment. 
We have concluded, in part II, supra, that the initial "sei-
zure" of the package and its contents was reasonable. N ev-
ertheless, as Place also holds, a seizure lawful at its inception 
can nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment because its 
manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory inter-
ests protected by the the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on 
"unreasonable seizures." 25 Here, the field test did affect re-
24 Respondents attempt to distinguish Place arguing that it involved no 
physical invasion of Place's effects, unlike the conduct at issue here. How-
ever, as the quotation makes clear, the reason this did not intrude upon 
any legitimate privacy interest was that the governmental conduct could 
reveal nothing about noncontraband items. That rationale is fully appli-
cable here. 
25 In Place, the Court held that while the initial seizure of luggage for the 
purpose of subjecting it to a "dog sniff" test was reasonable, the seizure 
82-1167-0PINION 
14 UNITED STATES v. JACOBSEN 
spondents' possessory interests protected by the Amend-
ment, since by destroying a quantity of the powder it con-
verted what had been only a temporary deprivation of 
possessory interests into a permanent one. To assess the 
reasonableness of this conduct, "[ w ]e must balance the nature 
and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against the importance of the govern-
mental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." Id., at 
26 --. 
Applying this test, we conclude that the destruction of the ,_ ' 
powder during the course of the field test was reasonable. 
The law enforcement interests justifying the procedure' were 
substantial; the suspicious nature of the material made it vir-
tually certain that the substance tested was in fact contra-
band. Conversely, because only a trace amount of material 
was involved, the loss of which appears to have gone unno-
ticed by respondents, and since the property had already 
been lawfully detained, the "seizure" could, at most, have 
only a de minimis impact on any protected property interest. 
Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 591-592 (1974) (plural-
ity opinion) (examination of automobile's tires and taking of 
paint scrapings was a de minimis invasion of constitutional 
interests). 27 Under these circumstances, the safeguards of a 
warrant would only minimally advance Fourth Amendment 
interests. This warrantless "seizure" was reasonable. 28 
became unreasonable because its length unduly intruded upon constitution-
ally protected interests. See id ., at -. 
26 See, e. g., Michigan v. Long,- U. S. -, - (1983); Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U. S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. 
Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 53~7 (1967). 
27 In fact, respondents do not contend that the amount of material tested 
was large enough to make it possible for them to have detected its loss. 
The only description in the record of the amount of cocaine seized is that 
"[i]t was a trace amount." Joint App. 75. 
26 See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) (warrantless search and 
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In sum, the federal agents did not infringe any constitu-
tionally protected privacy interest that had not already been 
frustrated as the result of private conduct. To the extent 
that a protected possessory interest was infringed, the in-
fringement was de minimis and constitutionally reasonable. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
search may not be). Cf. Place, -- U. S., at-- (approving brief war-
rantless seizure of luggage for purposes of "sniff test" based on its minimal 
intrusiveness and reasonable belief that the luggage contained contra-
band); Van Leeuwen v. United States, 397 U. S. 249, 252-253 (1970) (de-
tention of package on reasonable suspicion was justified since detention in-
fringed no "significant Fourth Amendment interest"). Of course, where 
more substantial invasions of constitutionally protected interests are in-
volved, a warrantless search or seizure is unreasonable in the absence of 
exigent circumstances. See, e. g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 
204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980); Dunaway v. New 
York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977). 
We do not suggest, however, that any seizure of a small amount of material 
is necessarily reasonable. An agent's arbitrary decision to take the "white 
powder" he finds in a neighbor's sugar bowl, or his medicine cabinet, and 
subject it to a field test for cocaine, might well work an unreasonable 
seizure. 
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Although t will join your opinion, I would appre-
ciate yo'ur considering onP. clarification. 
,, As probable cause is conceded in this case, I 
would not think it necessary to restate the applicable 
standard as i,s done on pp. 10-11 of your opinion. In any 
event; the sentence that begins on the bottom of page 10 may 
be read as implying that at least probable cause is a neces-
sary predicate to any valid seizure. In Sandra's recent 
decision in Place we held that some seizures may be iusti-
fied by an articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Of 
course, you do cite Place in footnote 21, as well as at oth-
er points in the opinion. 
With respect to the reasonableness of an expecta-
tion of privacy, addressed on page 3, I have a Court for the 
judgment in the open-fields cases. T.f they should come down 
before your dPcision in thfs case, you may wish to add them 
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Thank you for your suggestions. I will certainly 
add a citation to the open field cases if they come 
down before this opinion does. Also, I think you are 
correct that the opinion might be read as implying that 
probable cause is a necessary predicate for any valid 
seizure. As Place holds, that would not be correct. I 
wonder, therefore, if this might be an adequate 
solution to the problem. After the single sentence now 
in footnote 20, add:: 
"Therefore we need not decide whether the 
agents could have seized the package based on 
something less than probable cause. Some 
seizures can be justified by an articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity. See United 
States v. Place, u.s. (1983) ." 
If you don't think that is adequate, please let me know 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-1167 
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THOMAS JACOB-SEN AND DONNA 
MARIE JACOBSEN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1984] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
During their examination of a damaged package, the em-
ployees of a private freight carrier observed a white powdery 
substance, originally concealed within eight layers of 
wrappings. They summoned a federal agent, who removed 
a trace of the powder, subjected it to a chemical test and de-
termined that it was cocaine. The question presented is 
whether the Fourth Amendment required the agent to obtain 
a warrant before he did so. 
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Early in the morn-
ing of May 1, 1981, a supervisor at the Minneapolis-St. Paul 
airport Federal Express office asked the office manager to 
look at a package that had been damaged and torn by a fork-
lift. They then opened the package in order to examine its 
contents pursuant to a written company policy regarding in-
surance claims. 
The container was an ordinary cardboard box wrapped in 
brown paper. Inside the box five or six pieces of crumpled 
newspaper covered a tube about 10 inches long; the tube was 
made of the silver tape used on basement ducts. The super-
visor and office manager cut open the tube, and found a series 
of four zip-lock plastic bags, the outermost enclosing the 
other three and the innermost containing about six and a half 
ounces of white powder. When they observed the white 
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powder in the innermost bag, they notified the Drug En-
forcement Administration. Before the first DEA agent ar-
rived, they replaced the plastic bags in the tube and put the 
tube and the newspapers back into the box. 
When the first federal agent arrived, the box, still 
wrapped in brown paper, but with a hole punched in its side 
and the top open, was placed on a desk. The agent saw that 
one end of the tube had been slit open; he removed the four 
plastic bags from the tube and saw the white powder. He 
then opened each of the four bags and removed a trace of the 
white substance with a knife blade. A field test made on the 
spot identified the substance as cocaine. 1 
In due course, other agents arrived, made a second field 
test, rewrapped the package, obtained a warrant to search 
the place to which it was addressed, executed the warrant, 
and arrested respondents. After they were indicted for the 
crime of possessing an illegal substance with intent to distrib-
ute, their motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that 
the warrant was the product of an illegal search and seizure 
was denied; they were tried and convicted, and appealed. 
The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the validity of 
the search warrant depended on the validity of the agents' 
warrantless test of the white powder/ that the testing con-
' As the test is described in the evidence, it involved the use of three test 
tubes. When a substance containing cocaine is placed in one test tube 
after another, it will cause liquids to take on a certain sequence of colors. 
Such a test discloses whether or not the substance is cocaine, but there is 
no evidence that it would identify any other substances. 
2 The Court of Appeals did not hold that the facts would not have justi-
fied the issuance of a warrant without reference to the test results; the 
court merely held that the facts recited in the warrant application, which 
relied almost entirely on the results of the field tests , would not support 
the issuance of the warrant if the field test was itself unlawful. "It is ele-
mentary that in passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing court 
may consider only information brought to the magistrate's attention." 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 413, n. 3 (1969) (emphasis in origi-
nal) (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 109, n. 1 (1964)). See Illi-
nois v. Gates , 462 U. S. --, -- (1983). 
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stituted a significant expansion of the earlier private search, 
and that a warrant was required. 683 F. 2d 296 (8th Cir. 
1982). 
As the Court of Appeals recognized, its decision conflicted 
with a decision of another court of appeals on comparable 
facts, United States v. Barry, 673 F. 2d 912 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 U. S. -- (1982). 3 For that reason, and be-
cause field tests play an important role in the enforcement of 
the narcotics laws, we granted certiorari, 460 U. S. --. 
I 
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that 
the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated. . . . " This text protects two 
types of expectations, one involving "searches," the other 
"seizures." A "search" occurs when an expectation of pri-
vacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is in-
fringed. 4 A "seizure" of property occurs when a there is 
some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory 
interests in that property. 5 This Court has also consistently 
3 See also People v. Adler, 50 N. Y. 2d 730, 409 N. E. 2d 888, 431 
N. Y. S. 2d 412, cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1014 (1980); cf. United States v. 
Andrews, 618 F. 2d 646 (CA 10) (upholding warrantless field test without 
discussion), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 824 (1980). 
' See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U. S. - , - (1983); United States v. 
Knotts , 460 U. S. - , - (1983); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 
739-741 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 9 (1968). 
5 See United States v. Place, 462 U. S. -, (1983); id., at- (BREN-
NAN, J ., concurring in the result); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.-, -
(1983) (STEVENS, J. , concurring in the judgment); see also United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 13-14, n. 8 (1977); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 76 
(1906). While the concept of a "seizure" of property is not much discussed 
in our cases, this definition follows from our oft-repeated definition of the 
"seizure" of a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment-
meaningful interference, however brief, with an individual's freedom of 
movement. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 696 (1981); Reid v. 
Georgia, 448 U. S. 438, 440, n. * (1980) (per curiam); United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 551-554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J .); Brown 
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construed this protection as proscribing only governmental 
action; it is wholly inapplicable "to a search or seizure, even 
an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not act-
ing as an agent of the Government or with the participation 
or knowledge of any governmental official." Walter v. 
United States, 447 U. S. 649, 662 (1980) (BLACKMUN, J., 
dissenting). 6 
When the wrapped parcel involved in this case was deliv-
ered to the private freight carrier, it was unquestionably an 
"effect" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Let-
ters and other sealed packages are in the general class of ef-
fects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation 
of privacy; warrantless searches of such effects are presump-
tively unreasonable. 7 Even when government agents may 
lawfully seize such a package to prevent loss or destruction of 
suspected contraband, the Fourth Amendment requires that 
they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such 
a package. 8 Such a warrantless search could not be charac-
terized as reasonable simply because, after the official inva-
v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 50 (1979); United States v. Brignoni·Ponce, 422 
U. S. 873, 878 (1975); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Da· 
vis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721, 726-727 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 
1, 16, 19, n. 16 (1968). 
6 See id., at 656 (opinion of STEVENS, J .); id., at 660-661 (WHITE, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); United States v. Janis, 
428 U. S. 433, 455-456, n. 31 (1976); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U. S. 443, 487-490 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921). 
7 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 10 (1977); United States v. 
Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249, 251 (1970); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 
733 (1878); see also Walter, 447 U.S., at 654-655 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). 
8 See, e. g. , United States v. Place, 462 U. S. -,- (1983); United 
States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 809--812 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453 
U. S. 420, 426 (1981) (plurality opinion); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 
753, 762 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 13 and n. 8 (1977); 
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 (1970). There is, of course, 
a well recognized exception for customs searches; but that exception is not 
involved in this case. 
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sion of privacy occurred, contraband is discovered. 9 Con-
versely, in this case the fact that agents of the private carrier 
independently opened the package and made an examination 
that might have been impermissible for a government agent 
cannot render otherwise reasonable official conduct unrea-
sonable. The reasonableness of an official invasion of the cit-
izen's privacy must be appraised on the basis of the facts as 
they existed at the time that invasion occurred. 
The initial invasions of respondents' package were occa-
sioned by private action. Those invasions revealed that the 
package contained only one significant item, a suspiciO\lS 
looking tape tube. Cutting the end of the tube and extract-
ing its contents revealed a suspicious looking plastic bag of 
white powder. Whether those invasions were accidental or 
deliberate, 10 and whether they were reasonable or unreason-
able, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of 
their private character. 
The additional invasions of respondents' privacy by the 
government agent must be tested by the degree to which 
they exceeded the scope of the private search. That stand-
ard was adopted by a majority of the Court in Walter v. 
United States, 447 U. S. 649 (1980). In Walter a private 
party had opened a misdirected carton, found rolls of motion 
picture films that appeared to be contraband, and turned the 
carton over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Later, 
without obtaining a warrant, FBI agents obtained a projector 
9 See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 567, n. 11 (1971); Wong Sun v. 
United States , 371 U. S. 471, 484 (1963); Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 
253, 261-262 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 103 (1959); 
Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 312 (1958); United States v. DiRe, 
332 U. S. 581, 595 (1948); Byars v. United States , 273 U. S. 28, 29 (1927). 
10 A post-trial affidavit indicates that an agent of Federal Express may 
have opened the package because he was suspicious about its contents, and 
not because of damage from a forklift. However, the lower courts found 
no governmental involvement in the private search, a finding not chal-
lenged by respondents. The affidavit thus is of no relevance to the issue 
we decide. 
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and viewed the films. While there was no single opinion of 
the Court, a majority did agree on the appropriate analysis of 
a governmental search which follows on the heels of a private 
one. Two Justices took the position: 
"If a properly authorized official search is limited by 
the particular terms of its authorization, at least the 
same kind of strict limitation must be applied to any offi-
cial use of a private party's invasion of another person's 
privacy. Even though some circumstances-for exam-
ple, if the results of the private search are in plain view 
when materials are turned over to the Government-
may justify the Government's reexamination of the ma-
terials, surely the Government may not exceed the scope 
of the private search unless it has the right to make an 
independent search. In these cases, the private party 
had not actually viewed the films. Prior to the Govern-
ment's screening one could only draw inferences about 
what was on the films. The projection of the films was a 
significant expansion of the search that had been con-
ducted previously by a private party and therefore must 
be characterized as a separate search." I d., at 657 
(opinion of STEVENS, J., joined by Stewart, J.) (footnote 
omitted). 11 
Four additional Justices, while disagreeing with this charac-
terization of the scope of the private search, were also of the 
view that the legality of the governmental search must be 
tested by the scope of the antecedent private search. 
"Under these circumstances, since the L'Eggs employ-
ees so fully ascertained the nature of the films before 
contacting the authorities, we find that the FBI's subse-
11 See also id., at 658-659 (footnotes omitted) ("The fact that the cartons 
were unexpectedly opened by a third party before the shipment was deliv-
ered to its intended consignee does not alter the consignor's legitimate 
expectation of privacy. The private search merely frustrated that expec-
tation in part. It did not simply strip the remaining unfrustrated portion 
of that expectation of all Fourth Amendment protection"). 
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quent viewing of the movies on a projector did not 
'change the nature of the search' and was not an addi-
tional search subject to the warrant requirement." !d., 
at 663--664 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting, joined by BuR-
GER, C. J., POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ.) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 592 F. 2d 
788, 793--794 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Walter v. 
United States, 447 U. S. 649 (1980)). 12 
This standard follows from the analysis applicable when 
private parties reveal other kinds of private information to 
the authorities. It is well-settled that when an individual re-
veals private information to another, he assumes the risk 
that his confidant will reveal that information to the authori-
ties, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
hibit governmental use of that information. Once frustra-
tion of the original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the now-
nonprivate information: "This Court has held repeatedly that 
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of in-
formation revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to 
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed 
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited pur-
pose and the confidence placed in a third party will not be 
betrayed." United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 443 
(1975). 13 The Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the 
12 In Walter, a majority of the Court found a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. For present purposes, the disagreement between the ma-
jority and the dissenters in that case with respect to the comparison be-
tween the private search and the official search is less significant than the 
agreement on the standard to be applied in evaluating the relationship be-
tween the two searches. 
13 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 743--744 (1979); United States 
v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 749-753 (1971) (plurality opinion); Osborn v. 
United States, 385 U. S. 323, 326--331 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U. S. 293, 300-303 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206 (1966); 
Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 437-439 (1963); On Lee v. United 
States, 343 U. S. 747, 753--754 (1952). See also United States v. Henry, 
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authorities use information with respect to which the expec-
tation of privacy has not already been frustrated. In such a 
case the authorities have not relied on what is in effect a pri-
vate search, and therefore presumptively violate the Fourth 
Amendment if they act without a warrant. 14 
In this case, the federal agents' invasions of respondents' 
privacy involved two steps: first, they removed the tube from 
the box, the plastic bags from the tube and a trace of powder 
from the innermost bag; second, they made a chemical test of 
the powder. Although we ultimately conclude that both ac-
tions were reasonable for essentially the same reason, it is 
useful to discuss them separately. 
II 
When the first federal agent on the scene initally saw the 
package, he knew it contained nothing of significance except 
a tube containing plastic bags and, ultimately, white powder. 
It is not entirely clear that the powder was visible to him be-
fore he removed the tube from the box. 15 Even if the white 
powder was not itself in "plain view" because it was still en-
447 U. S. 264, 272 (1980); United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 744, 
750-751 (1979). 
"See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 
388 U. S. 41 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505 (1961). 
' 5 Daniel Stegemoller, the Federal Express office manager, testified at 
the suppression hearing that the white substance was not visible without 
reentering the package at the time the first agent arrived. Joint App. 
42--43; 58. The magistrate's report contained a finding that the gray tube 
and powder were in plain view, which respondents challenged before the 
District Court. The District Court declined to resolve respondents' objec-
tion, ruling that fact immaterial and assuming for purposes of its decision 
"that the newspaper in the box covered the gray tube and that neither the 
gray tube nor the contraband could be seen when the box was turned over 
the the DEA agents." App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a-13a. At trial, the fed-
eral agent first on the scene testified that the powder was not visible until 
after he pulled the plastic bags out of the tube. Joint App. 71-72. As our 
discussion will make clear, we agree with the District Court that it does 
not matter whether the loose piece of newspaper covered the tube at the 
time the agent first saw the box. 
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closed in so many containers and covered with papers, there 
was a virtual certainty that nothing else of significance was in 
the package and that a manual inspection of the tube and its 
contents would not tell him anything more than he already 
had been told. Respondents do not dispute that the Govern-
ment could utilize the Federal Express employees' testimony 
concerning the contents of the package. If that is the case, it 
hardly infringed respondents' privacy for the agents to re-
examine the contents of the package. The advantage the 
Government gained thereby was merely avoiding the risk of 
a flaw in the employees' recollection, rather than in further 
infringing respondents' privacy. Protecting the risk of mis-
description hardly enhances any legitimate privacy interest, 
and is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 16 
Thus, the removal of the plastic bags from the tube and the 
agent's visual inspection of their contents enabled the agent 
to learn nothing that had not previously been learned during 
the private search. 17 It infringed no legitimate expectation 
of privacy and hence was not a "search" within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
16 See United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 750-751 (1979); United 
States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 749-753 (1971) (plurality opinion); United 
States v. Osborn, 385 U. S. 323, 32&-331 (1966); On Lee v. United States, 
343 U. S. 747, 753-754 (1952). For example, in Lopez v. United States, 
373 U. S. 427 (1963), the Court wrote: "Stripped to its essentials, petition-
er's argument amounts to saying that he has a constitutional right to rely 
on possible flaws in the agent's memory, or to challenge the agent's credi-
bility without being beset by corroborating evidence . .. . For no other ar-
gument can justify excluding an accurate version of a conversation that the 
agent could testify to from memory. We think the risk that petitioner 
took in offering a bribe to Davis fairly included the risk that the offer would 
be accurately reproduced in court . .. . " Id., at 439 (footnote omitted). 
"Moreover, since the Federal Express employees had of their own ac-
cord invited the federal agent to their offices for the express purpose of 
viewing the contents of the package, the agent's viewing of what a private 
party had freely made available for his inspection did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
487-490 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 476-476 (1921). 
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While the agents' assertion of dominion and control over 
the package and its contents did constitute a "seizlire," 18 that 
seizure was not unreasonable. The fact that, prior to the 
field test, respondents' privacy interest in the contents of the 
package had been largely compromised, is highly relevant to 
the reasonableness of the agents' conduct in this respect. In 
I light of what the agents already knew about the contents of the package, it was as if the contents were in plain view. 
The examination of the tube and the powder it contained was 
comparable to the police officer's observation of a balloon 
"the distinctive character [of which] itself spoke volumes as 
to its contents, particularly to the trained eye of the officer." 
Texas v. Brown,-- U.S.--,-- (1983) (plurality opin-
ion); see also id., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). The balloon was like the hypothetical gun case in Ar-
kansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979), both of which are 
containers which "by their very nature cannot support any 
reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can 
be inferred from their outward appearance." I d., at 
764-765, n. 13. Such containers may be seized, at least tem-
porarily, without a warrant on probable cause. 19 Accord-
ingly, since it was apparent that the tube and plastic bags 
contained contraband and little else, this warrantless seizure 
was reasonable, 20 for it is well-settled that it is constitution-
18 Both the Magistrate and the District Court found that the agents took 
custody of the package from Federal Express after they arrived. Al-
though respondents had entrusted possession of the items to Federal Ex-
press, the decision by governmental authorities to exert dominion and con-
trol over the package for their own purposes clearly constituted a 
"seizure," though not necessarily an unreasonable one. See United States 
v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 (1970). Indeed, this is one thing on which 
the entire Court appeared to agree in Walter. 
19 See also United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 822-823 (1982); Robbins 
v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 428-428 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
20 Respondents concede that the agents had probable cause to believe the 
package contained contraband. Therefore we need not decide whether the 
agents could have seized the package based on something less than proba-
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ally reasonable for law enforcement officials may seize "ef-
fects" that cannot support a justifiable expectation of privacy 
without a warrant based on probable cause to believe they 
contain contraband. 21 
III 
The question remains whether the additional intrusion oc-
casioned by the field test, which had not been conducted by 
the Federal Express agents and therefore exceeded the 
scope of the private search, was an unlawful "search" or "sei-
zure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
The field test at issue could disclose only one fact previ-
ously unknown to the agent-whether or not a suspicious 
white powder was cocaine. It could tell him nothing more, 
not even whether the substance was sugar or talcum powder. 
We must first determine whether this can be considered a 
"search" subject to the Fourth Amendment-did it infringe 
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider 
reasonable? 
The concept of an interest in privacy that society is pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, criti-
cally different from the mere expectation, however well justi-
fied, that certain facts will not come to the attention of the 
authorities. 22 Indeed, this distinction underlies the rule that 
ble cause. Some seizures can be justified by an articulable suspicion of 
criminal activity. See United States v. Place, 462 U. S. -- (1983). 
21 See Place, 462 U. S., at--; Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S., at--; id., 
at-- (STEVENS, J., concurring in the judgment); Payton v. New York, 
445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980); G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 
338, 354 (1977); Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234, 236 (1968) (per 
curiam). 
22 "Obviously, however, a 'legitimate' expectation of privacy by definition 
means more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered. A bur-
glar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may have a 
thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one 
which the law recognizes as 'legitimate.' His presence, in the words of 
Jones [v. United States , 362 U. S. 257, 267 (1960)], is 'wrongful,' his expec-
tation of privacy is not one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able.' Katz v. United States , 389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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Government may utilize information voluntarily disclosed to 
a governmental informant, despite the criminal's reasonable 
expectation that his associates would not disclose confidential 
information to the authorities. See United States v. White, 
401 U. S. 745, 751-752 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a par-
ticular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legiti-
mate interest in privacy. This conclusion is not dependent 
on the result of any particular test. It is probably safe to 
assume that virtually all of the tests conducted under circum-
stances comparable to those disclosed by this record would 
result in a positive finding; in such cases, no legitimate inter-
est has been compromised. But even if the results are nega-
tive-merely disclosing that the substance is something other 
than cocaine-such a result reveals nothing of special inter-
est. Congress has decided-and there is no question about 
its power to do so-to treat the interest in "privately" pos-
sessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental conduct 
that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other 
arguably "private" fact, compromises no legitimate privacy 
interest. 23 
And it would, of course, be merely tautological to fall back on the notion 
that those expectations of privacy which are legitimate depend primarily 
on cases deciding exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases. Legitimation 
of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth 
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property 
law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143-144, n. 12 (1978). See also United 
States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. -- (1983) (use of a beeper to track car's move-
ments infringed no reasonable expectation of privacy); Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U. S. 735 (1979) (use of a pen register to record phone numbers dialed 
infringed no reasonable expectation of privacy). 
23 See Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the In-
nocent, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1229 (1983). Our discussion, of course, is con-
fined to possession of contraband. It is not necessarily the case that the 
purely "private" possession of an article that cannot be distributed in com-
merce is itself illegitimate. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969). 
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This conclusion is dictated by United States v. Place, 462 
U. S. -- (1983), in which the Court held that subjecting 
luggage to a "sniff test" by a trained narcotics detection 
dog was not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment: 
"A 'canine sniff' by a well-trained narcotics detection 
dog, however, does not require opening of the luggage. 
It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise 
would remain hidden from public view, as does, for ex-
ample, an officer's rummaging through the contents of 
the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is 
obtained through this investigative technique is much 
less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff 
discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a 
contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff 
tells the authorities something about the contents of the 
luggage, the information obtained is limited." ld., at 
24 
Here, as in Place, the likelihood that official conduct of the 
kind disclosed by the record will actually compromise any le-
gitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote to char-
acterize the testing as a search subject to the Fourth 
Amendment. 
We have concluded, in Part II, supra, that the initial "sei-
zure" of the package and its contents was reasonable. N ev-
ertheless, as Place also holds, a seizure lawful at its inception 
can nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment because its 
manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory inter-
ests protected by the the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on 
"' Respondents attempt to distinguish Place arguing that it involved no 
physical invasion of Place's effects, unlike the conduct at issue here. How-
ever, as the quotation makes clear, the reason this did not intrude upon 
any legitimate privacy interest was that the governmental conduct could 
reveal nothing about noncontraband items. That rationale is fully appli-
cable here. 
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"unreasonable seizures." 25 Here, the field test did affect re-
spondents' possessory interests protected by the Amend-
ment, since by destroying a quantity of the powder it con-
verted what had been only a temporary deprivation of 
possessory interests into a permanent one. To assess the 
reasonableness of this conduct, "[ w ]e must balance the nature 
and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against the importance of the govern-
mental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." /d., at 
26 --. 
Applying this test, we conclude that the destruction of the 
powder during the course of the field test was reasonable. 
The law enforcement interests justifying the procedure were 
substantial; the suspicious nature of the material made it vir-
tually certain that the substance tested was in fact contra-
band. Conversely, because only a trace amount of material 
was involved, the loss of which appears to have gone unno-
ticed by respondents, and since the property had already 
been lawfully detained, the "seizure" could, at most, have 
only a de minimis impact on any protected property interest. 
Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 591-592 (1974) (plural-
ity opinion) (examination of automobile's tires and taking of 
paint scrapings was a de minimis invasion of constitutional 
interests). 27 Under these circumstances, the safeguards of a 
25 In Place, the Court held that while the initial seizure of luggage for the 
purpose of subjecting it to a "dog sniff" test was reasonable , the seizure 
became unreasonable because its length unduly intruded upon constitution-
ally protected interests. See id., at -. 
26 See, e. g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. -, - (1983); Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U. S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. 
Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 53!H>37 (1967). 
?:1 In fact, respondents do not contend that the amount of material tested 
was large enough to make it possible for them to have detected its loss. 
The only description in the record of the amount of cocaine seized is that 
"[i]t was a trace amount." Joint App. 75. 
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warrant would only minimally advance Fourth Amendment 
interests. This warrantless "seizure" was reasonable. 28 
In sum, the federal agents did not infringe any constitu-
tionally protected privacy interest that had not already been 
frustrated as the result of private conduct. To the extent 
that a protected possessory interest was infringed, the in-
fringement was de minimis and constitutionally reasonable. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
28 See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) (warrantless search and 
seizure limited to scraping suspect's fingernails justified even when full 
search may not be). Cf. Place, 462 U. S., at-- (approving brief war-
rantless seizure of luggage for purposes of "sniff test" based on its minimal 
intrusiveness and reasonable belief that the luggage contained contra-
band); Van Leeuwen v. United States , 397 U. S. 249, 252-253 (1970) (de-
tention of package on reasonable suspicion was justified since detention in-
fringed no "significant Fourth Amendment interest"). Of course, where 
more substantial invasions of constitutionally protected interests are in-
volved, a warrantless search or seizure is unreasonable in the absence of 
exigent circumstances. See, e. g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 
204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980); Dunaway v. New 
York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977). 
We do not suggest, however, that any seizure of a small amount of material 
is necessarily reasonable. An agent's arbitrary decision to take the "white 
powder" he finds in a neighbor's sugar bowl, or his medicine cabinet, and 
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